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The right which members of the public have to use a public highway is not an
absolute right, but must be exercised in a reasonable manner, regard being had tv
all the circumstances of the case.
Where a builder has three ways of access to a building site, and uses only one,
and that principally at the busiest hours of the day, causing special or particular
damage to another person, such user is not reasonable.
Where the private right of an owner of laud to access to the road is unlawfully
interfered with, he is entitled to recover damages from the wrongdoer to the exteunt
of the loss of profits of the business carried on by him on his premises.
A person is entitled to recover damages for a private injury resulting from a
public nuisance, where there is a particular, a direct and a substantial damage to
him, such as that arising from an unreasonable obstruction to the access to his premises from the road, occasioning loss of profits.
Benjamin v. Storr, L. R. 9 C. P. 400, considered and followed. Ricket v.
Mfetropolitan Railway Company, L. R. 2 H. L. 175, distinguished.

Where damages are sought in the Chancery Division under Lord Cairns's Act, in
substitution for an injunction, in respect of wrongful acts which have continued
after the issue of the writ, but have come to an end before the trial of the action,
tl'e entire damages occasioned by the whole of the wrongful acts are recoverable.

THIS was an action for tiespass and nuisance in the course of the
defendant's building operations on premises adjacent to the plain-

tiff's. The plaintiff was a tailor, and also a dealer in old china
and other curiosities, carrying on business on leasehold premises,
having a western frontage of six feet towards Fetter lane. Fleet
street, and a southern frontage of forty-four feet towards a narrow
passage leading from Fetter lane eastwards into Fleur de Lys court.
Fleur de Lys court ran past the eastern frontage of the plaintiff's
premises, and after continuing for some distance in the same southerly direction, and parallel to Fetter lane, turned westwards into
Fetter lane.
On the opposite side of Fleur de Lys court, and facing the southeastern angle of the plaintiff's premises, were premises belonging
to the Scottish Corporation, on which the hall of the corporation
stood until its destruction by fire. After that event, the defendant,
a builder, was employed by the corporation to rebuild the ball, and
he commenced his operations on or about May 21st 1879. There
were three passages by which it was possible to obtain access to the
site of the new hall, viz.: first, by the passage which ran past the
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plaintiff's premises, and which was five feet nine inches in width,
and the whole length of which, from Fetter lane to the westeln
boundary of the new hall, was only fifty feet; second, by Fleur de
Lys court; and third, by Crane court, running southwards into
Fleet street. The distance of the site of the hall from Fetter lane
through Fleur de Lys court, and from Fleet street through Crane
court, was considerably greater than the distance from Fetter lane
through the plaintiff's passage. It was proved at the trial that all
the heavy building materials and very nearly all the light materials were taken through the plaintiff's passage.
On August 7th 1879, the plaintiff commenced the present action.
By his statement of claim he alleged that the defendant had carried
on his building operations negligently and without proper care and
precautions, and that he had caused the same to be a continual
nuisance to the plaintiff and persons living in his house, and had
thereby done injury to the plaintiff.
The statement of claim then went on to detail the particulars in
which the defendant was alleged to have injured the plaintiff, viz.,
by placing iron girders, stones and other articles against the plaintiff's doorways, and committing similar acts of trespass; by creating an unnecessary quantity of dirt and dust; by preventing access
to the plaintiff's premises, and unreasonably blocking up the street,
i. e., Fetter lane; by blocking up windows, and so interfering with
the plaintiff's ancient lights. And the plaintiff alleged that by
reason of the acts aforesaid, his business, as a dealer in curiosities,
had fallen off, and his monthly takings diminishe& from 401. to 91.;
that he had also suffered in his business as a tailor, and fiom the
loss of lodgers, and had been put to expense and inconvenience in
other respects. The plaintiff further alleged that the passage by
the side of his nouse was a private entrance, for the use only of
himself and toot passengers going to the houses in Fleur de Lys
court, and that the defendant had no right to use the passage for
his building operations. And he claimed an injunction to restrain
the defendant from continuing or repeating the alleged trespasses
and nuisances, and damages. Before the hearing, however, the
building was completed, and the acts complained of had come to an
end, so that the action was resolved into an action for damages.
By his statement of defence, the defendant denied that the passage was a private entrance, and he denied the other allegations
of the plaintiff seriatim, and generally that there had been any
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negligence or want of care and precautions in his building operations, and he alleged that for various reasons the plaintiff's passage
was the only one of the three routes of access to the building site
by which it was possible to convey heavy materials.
This was the hearing of the action with witnesses.
.orth, Q. C., and Seward Brice, for the plaintiff.-The defendant has exceeded his rights, and has injured the plaintiff to a considerable extent, and the plaintiff is entitled to have his losses made
good by the defendant: R. v. Cross, 3 Camp. 224; R. v. Jones,
Id. 230 ; R. v. Rus8ell, 6 East 427. The real question is whether
the user by the defendant has been reasonable: Cory v. Thames
Iron-works Company, L. R. 3 Q. B. 181; Tipping v. St. Belen's
Smelting Company, 4 B. & S. 608.
Cookson, Q. C., and Northmore Lawrence, for the defendant.The main question at issue in this case is with regard to the loss
of custom, which really includes the loss of lodgers. The loss
which the plaintiff has sustained in this respect, if it exists at all,
has been very greatly exaggerated; but, in any case, the damage
sustained is too remote, and the plaintiff cannot recover in respect
of it. The decision of the House of Lords in .Ricket v. Metropolitan Railway Company, L: R. 2 H. L. 175, affirming that of the
Exchequer Chamber, 5 B. & S. 149, and overruling Wilkes v. Hunge2ford Mfarket Company, 2 Bing. N. C. 281, is a distinct authority
in favor of this proposition.
Fuy, J., stated the facts of the case, and referring, in the first
place, to the alleged trespass, which he considered to be of the most
trifling description, awarded the plaintiff damages to the extent
of one farthing in respect thereof. He then continued:
The serious part of the plaintiff's case arises from his allegation
of the loss of custom to him in his character of a dealer in articles
of antiquity, old china and so forth, and of a tailor. With regard
to the latter, there is no evidence of loss. With regard to the
former, I shall consider it hereafter.
The plaintiff puts his case in two ways. He says, in the first
place, that the defendant has created a public nuisance, which
public nuisance has resulted in special or peculiar damage to me,
in consequence of the place where I reside and that where the nuisance has been committed being so near to one another; and, in
XXVIII.-78
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the next place, I have 'a private right of entrance from the highway to my dwelling-house, and with that private right you have
interfered.
Before I consider those rights separately, I must inquire whether
the user by the defendant of the roadway of Fetter lane and the
passage has been reasonable or unreasonable. The law with regard
to the point appears to me to be easily gathered from one or two
cases. The case of B. v. Jones has been referred to. There Lord
ELLENBOROUGH says, as to the repairing of a house, "The public

must submit to the inconvenience occasioned necessarily in repairing
a house; but if this inconvenience is prolonged for an unreasonable time, the public have a right to complain, and the party may
be indicted for a nuisance." Again, in Benjamin v. Storr, Law
Rep. 9 0. P. 400, the question left by Mr. Justice HONYMAN to
the jury was "whether or not the obstruction of the street was
greater than was reasonable in point of time and manner, taking
into consideration the interests of all parties, and without unnecessary inconvenience," he telling them they were not to consider
solely what was convenient for the business of the defendants.
The defendant at the bar has asserted an unqualified and absolute
right to approach the area of the building operations which he was'
carrying on by the nearest road, to any extent, for any materials,
for any time, and without regard to the plaintiff's convenience or
inconvenience. Such a claim is, in my judgment, untenable. It
appears to me to be the expression of the selfish and not of the
social man-of the man who recollects his rights, but who does not
recollect his obligations; and human life could not be carried on
if such extreme rights were asserted and insisted on.
The question I have to inquire into is whether the user of the
road or the roads in question by the defendant was, having regard
to all the circumstances of the case, reasonable. The circumstances
are undoubtedly peculiar. The block of buildings which the defendant had to erect was capable of being got at from roads only by
means of three passages-Crane court, leading from Fleet street;
Fleur de Lys court, leading from the southern part of Fetter lane;
and what has been called for convenience the plaintiff's passage, or
the plaintiff's court, leading directly from the northern part of the
site into Fetter lane. That last passage was undoubtedly the most
convenient mode of access for the defendant to the site. It was
the most convenient for several reasons. It was the shortest, and
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t also led to that portion of the property which the defendant used
as a yard for the purpose of his building operations. It must be
further observed that the operations which the defendant had to
carry on were very considerable. The building contract was for
nearly 60001. A very large quantity of old buildings and rubbish
had to be removed-a quantity that took from the 21st of May to
the 9th of July in removing. A very large quantity of materials
had to be carried in for the purpose of the new hall and chapel
which the defendant erected for the Scottish Corporation-operations which lasted for several months. Under these circumstances,
it appears to me that to carry on the whole of the defendant's operations through what has been called the plaintiff's passage was not
reasonable. I am unable to see any reason why a large proportion
of the old materials might not have been carried down Crane court,
and why a much larger proportion might not have been carried
down Fleur de Lys court, and the inconvenience necessarily created by carrying away rubbish of that character distributed over
the whole of the passages that gave access to the site. Further
than that, it appears to me that the defendant, having regard to
the peculiar difficulties of the case, should have made some different
arrangement with regard to the time during which his operations
were carried on. In fact, he carried them on during the busiest
and most occupied hours of the day, and took no pains to diminish
the inconvenience by carrying on his operations early in the morn
ing or late at night. What was the result upon the plaintiff of
these operations so carried on by the defendant? Undoubtedly
the passage close by his house was practically devoted to the building operations of the defendant for a long period of time. For
exactly how many days it was unsafe to cross that passage I do not
know, but certainly for months these operations went on, and it
appears to me that they went on in such a manner as to render it
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for persons to obtain access
to the plaintiff's premises from Fleet street, coming up on the
eastern side of Fetter lane, and the natural effect of it would be to
drive persons away who might have become customers, and to render the access to the plaintiff's house so difficult that most persons
would abandon passing along that side of the road; and there is
some evidence that persons who were in the frequent habit of going
to the plaintiff's house as customers ceased to do so during a portion of the time these operations were going on.
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What has been the 'result of these operations, therefore, to the
plaintiff? I have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has
proved that he has sustained considerable loss in his business as a
dealer in old curiosities, in consequence of the defendant's operations, and although it is very difficult to assess the amount of that
loss, I have, sitting as a judge of fact, arrived at the conclusion that
he has sustained loss to the extent of 601.
Then arises the question, or questions, how far this state of circumstances gives rise to any legal right in the plaintiff. Now the
cases of Rose v. Groves, 5 M. & G. 613, and Lyon v. Pihmongers' Comlpany, L. R. 1 App. Cases 662 in the House of Lords,
appear to me to establish this: that where the private right of
the owner of land to access to the road is interfered with, and
unlawfully interfered with, by the acts of the defendant, he may
recover damages from the wrongdoer to the extent of the loss
of profits of the business carried on at that place. The case of
Rose v. Groves was that of an owner of a riparian property, but
it is referred to by the lord chancellor in the case of Lyon v. .Fishmongers' Company, and he cites there an observation of Lord
HATEERLEY in another case to this effect: "I apprehend that the
right of the owner of a private wharf, or of a roadside property, to
have access thereto, is a totally different right from the public right
of passing and repassing along the highway .on the river." Then
the lord chancellor continues: "The existence of such a private
right of access was recognised in Rose v. Groves. As I understand the judgment in that case, it went, not on the ground of
public nuisance, accompanied by particular damage to the plaintiff.
but upon the principle that a private right of the plaintiff had been.
interfered with." Then, after more fully examining that case, and
expressing not the slightest intention to differ from it, his lordship
says: "Independently of the authorities, it appears to me quite
clear that the right of a man to step from his own land on to a
highway is something quite different from the public right of using
the highway. The public have no right to step on to the land of a
private proprietor adjoining the road. And though it is easy to
suggest metaphysical difficulties when an attempt is made to define
the private as distinguished from the public right, or to explain
how the one could be infringed without at the same time interfering
with the other, this does not alter the character of the right." Applying that principle to the present case, it does appear to me that
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the evidence shows that the access to the plaintiff's door in the
passage from the street was interfered with by the acts of the
defendant, which I hold to be unreasonable, and, therefore, wrongful, and that being so, the cases to which I have referred are
authorities for the plaintiff on that ground, and entitle him to
recover the amount of loss in his businiess carried on upon his
property.
But I will consider the case further, on the ground of the private injury resulting from the public nuisance. The conditions
under which a private person may recover in such a case as that
are well expressed in thejudgment of Lord Justice BRETT, then a
member of the Court of Common Pleas, in the case of Benjamin
v. Storr, L. R. 9 C. P. 400. "The cases referred to upon this
subject," his lordship says, "show that there are three things which
the plaintiff must substantiate, beyond the existence of the mere
public nuisance, before lie can be entitled to recover. In the first
place, he must show a particular injury to himself beyond that
which is sufftred by the rest of the public." Now, I ask whether
in this case the plaintiff has or has not sustained that particular
injury from the public nuisance? It appears to me that he has.
The case of breson v. lloore is a case of great authority. It
is reported in numerous books. R has found its way into the
various digests of the law, and has been cited with approval in
the great case of Ricket v. The Metropolitan Railway Company,
L. R. 2 H. of L. 175, by the Court of Exchequer Chamber,
and the case itself was decided by the Court of Exchequer Chainber. Now, as cited in Comyn's Digest, 5th ed., vol. 1, p. 278,
that case resulted in this: "If A. has a colliery, and B. stops
up a highway near it, whereby nothing can pass to such colliery,
an action upon the case lies, for he ought to be remedied in particular, though it was a highway for all." And, accordingly, in
the case of Benjamin v. Storr, the learned judge before referred to
considered that, "if, by reason of the access to his premises being
obstructed for an unreasonable time, and in an unreasonable manner, the plaintiff's customers we're prevented from coming to his
coffee-shop, and he suffered a material diminution of trade-that
might be a particular, a direct and a substantial damage." No
doubt, Ricket's ease shows that where the obstruction is at a considerable distance and temporary, and the injury which the plaintiff sastains is only in common with a large number of other
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persons, such a right of action does not arise; but it appears to mr,
that this case is far more like the case of Iveson v. Moore and the
case of Benjamin v. Storr than the case either of Wilkes v. Hungerford Market Co., 2 Bing. N. C. 281, or the case of Ricket v.
Railway Go., 8upra, and that there is here that particular injury
to the plaintiff, resulting from a public nuisance, which is referred
to in those cases.
The second condition which is referred to by Lord Justice BRETT
is this: "Other cases," he says, "show that the injury to the individual must be direct, and not a mere consequential injury." Now
I have already considered that point, and the cases I have already
referred to seem to show that this is sufficiently direct.
Lastly, "the injury must be shown to be of a substantial character, not fleeting or evanescent." What is the meaning of those
words-" fleeting or evanescent?" It is not, perhaps, easy to
answer that, but it appears to me that nothing can be deemed to be
fleeting or evanescent which results in substantial damage, and
that the question, therefore, is not one to be measured by time, but
one to e measured by its effects upon the plaintiff; and, accordingly, in the case to which I have referred, and which, it appears to
me, I am bound to treat as law, I find that the interruption for the
course of one month of a public highway, was deemed sufficient
interference to give the plaintiff a right of action, and that case, I
repeat, is one which has been adopted and approved of by the
Court of Exchequer Chamber in .icket's case. The result, therefore, to my mind, is this-that even upon the ground of public
nuisance, the plaintiff has made out his case, and it follows from
what I have said that it appears to me that the plaintiff is entitled
to a judgment to the extent of 601.
But then this argument was raised by the defendant. It was
said that the 601. represents damages accrued to the plaintiff after
the issue of the writ, and that the only thing which the court can
now assess is the amount of damage sustained anterior to the writ
and that, therefore, the whole amount cannot now be recovered.
Nothing that I intend to say will affect the general question whether
the damages sought for by a writ, or by a counter-claim, go back to
the date of the writ or counter-claim. What I have to consider is
the power and duty of the court in a case in which, there being
jurisdiction to grant injunctions, the court, in substitution for that
injunction, grants damages under Lord Cairns's Act. Now, as we
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all know, the power of the court given by that statute is, if it thinks
fit, to grant damages in substitution for, or in addition to, an
injunction, and I am now asked to give it in substitution for an
injunction.
Now, it is manifest that no damages can be an adequate substitute for an injunction, unless the damages cover the whole area
which would have been covered by an injunction, and that is often
one difficulty in giving damages in lieu of an injunction; but here
the circumstances are peculiar. The damages sought for are partly
those accruing before the writ, and partly those accruing after the
writ, but all before the trial; because this is a case in which the
cause of the annoyance had come to an end before the trial of the
action.
Ought I, under those circumstances, to refuse to give the entire
damages which would covei the whole ground which the injunction
might have covered, or am I to leave the plaintiff to bring a second
iction for the damages accruing between the issue of the writ and
the conclusion of the operations of the defendant? It is manifest
that to do the second would be to do a thing inconvenient, and one
that seems to me to be at variance with the intention of Lord
Cairns's Act, which was clearly intended to prevent the multiplicity
of actions and the excess of costs.
It appears to me, however, that the question is covered by
authority, and by authority cited to me by the defendant's counsel.
In the case of Davenport v. 1ylands, Lord HATHERLEY, sitting
as vice-chancellor, had a case in which an injunction had been
sought for in respect of the infringement of a patent. Before the
case was heard, the patent had expired, and he was then asked to
assess damages in lieu of the injunction. The first question raised
was whether, the patent being gone, the injunction could be granted,
or whether, if it could not be granted, the jurisdiction to give damages arose. The vice-chancellor held that he had jurisdiction.
The next inquiry, of course, was what damages he should assess,
and what he directed was this-an inquiry what damages the
plaintiff had sustained, and he added-" The inquiry must extend
to the sale by the defendants of any articles manufactured by them,
within six years before the filing of the bill and up to the expiry
of the patent, by that process the exclusive use of which was
He, theresecured by the letters-patent in the bill mentioned."
fore, in that case did not stop the assessment of the damages at the
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issuing of the writ, but continued it up to the termination of the
wrong. I shall gladly follow that precedent, and direct that the
whole sum which I have mentioned, and which, as I have said,
includes the damages sustained subsequent to the issue of the writ,
be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff.
From what I have said, it follows that the general costs of the
action must be borne-by the defendant; but considering that a portion of the plaintiff's elaim was addressed to those frivolous trespasses I have mentioned, I shall disallow 101. of the costs.
The main principle involved in the
foregoing case is usually stated in such
general terms as to give but little light
as to its true meaning and extent, much
less as to its practical application ; that
can best be gathered from a careful examination of the cases in which the rule
has been considered and applied. Some
conflict will, no doubt, appear among
them. For, while all substantially agree
as to the rule itself, they sometimes differ
as to its application. Much of this confusion is, doubtless; owing to the terms
sometimes employed when describing the
kind of damages which give a right of
private action for a public nuisance.
Many call them "special" or "particuis,
lax" damags, while "peculiar"
apparently, a more appropriate word.
Special, properly speaking, is not in
contrast or opposition to general, but is
included in and comes under it, as the
species is included in the genus. Besides,
the phrase "special damages" has a distinct and well-known meaning in the law
quite different from that involved in the
subject under consideration. "Particular," also, though a better word than
"special," fails to bring out the precise
idea. Etymologically, it applies to a particle or small part of a thing ; it comes under special as that does under general-as
&particular case or illustration of a special
rule. Neither word exactly expresses
the thought. A person might suffer
both special and particular damage by
a publc nuisance, and yet have- no cause
on
of acti:t. The word "peculiar,"

the other hand, always implies something
private; exclusively one's own; not common to the many; unlike any other person's. Particular qualifies that which
belongs to one and the same kind; peculiar qualifies that which belongs to some
particular individual or class; the very
essence of the private action.
With this explanation, let us consider
some of the cases in which the doctrine
has been involved. They, for the most
part, relate to obstructions in public highways, on land or water, and, naturally.
range themselves into four classes.
1st. Where damage is claimed for mere
inconvenience or inability of passing and
repassing by the plaintiff himself, without
regard to any estate he may have.
2d. Where the obstruction complained
of is immediately in front of or adjacent
to the plaintiff's premises, so that access
thereto is directly and immediately impeded.
3d. Where the obstruction interferes
with the access to and from the plaintiff's
premises, at some distance more or less
therefrom, and so naturally tends Lo
depreciate its value.
4th. Where the damage alleged is mere
loss of business and profits.
I. As to the first point, two things are
obvious; one is, that no action will ever
lie if the plaintiff did not attempt to use
the way at all, but remained at home because of the obstruction. An indictment
would, of course, lie, although no person
had ever wanted or tried to use the way
since the obstruction; the possibilitf of
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mconvenience is sufficient; not so for the
private suit. See Baxterv. The Wznooski
Turnpike Co., 22 Vt. 114 (1849).
The other is, that if the plaintiff in
attempting to use the way, sustains a direct injury in his person or property, an
action will always lie. See Sanders v.
Fowler, Cro. Jac. 446 (1619) ; Marriott
v. Stanley, 1 M. & Gr. 568 (1840) ;
Goldthorpe v. Hardman, 13 M1. & W.
377 (1844); Clark v. Lake, 1 Scam.
229 (1835); Martin v. Bliss, 5 Blackf.
35 (1838).
It is in the border land, between these
two extremes, where the difficulty arises.
And, first, as to an action for mere delay
or deviation caused by the obstruction.
Thus. inconvenience merely, clearly does
not sustain a private action.
As early as 1536, in Year Book 27
Hen. 8, page 27, pl. 10, where the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
stopped the "royal chemin," by which
he used to carry and recarry his things
from his close to his house, BALDWIN,
C. J., said, that the party should be punished only by presentment in the leet for
a common nuisance, and that if one could
maintain an action another might, and so
the party might be punished a hundred
times for the same cause.
In Co. Litt. 56 a, it is said a diversity
exists between a private way and a common way; for, if the way be a common
way, if any man be disturbed to goe that
way, or if a ditch be made overthwart
the way so as he cannot goe, yet shall he
not have an action upon his case, and
this the law provided for avoiding of
multiplicity of suites; for if anyone man
might have an action, all men might have
the like. But the law for this common
nuisance hath provided an ample remedy,
and that is by presentment in the leete,
or in the torme, unless any man hath a
particular damage, as if he and his horse
fell into the ditch, whereby he received
hart and losse, there for this special damage, which is not common to others, he
*hall have an action on his case, and all
VOL. XXVIII.- 79

this was resolved by the court in King's
Bench.
The leading case, perhaps, is -Tneux v.
Hovenden, Cro. Eliz. 664 (1599). The
plaintiff there alleged "there had been a
way within the city of Canterbury, leading from St. Peters' street into a street
called Rush-market ; and that all the inhabitants of the city used, time whereof,
&c., to pass that way; and that the
plaintiff was an inhabitant there; that
the defendant had made a ditch and
erected a pole across that way, whereby he
had lost his passage, &c." But, after
verdict for the plaintiff, it was held by
POPHAM, GAUDY and FENNeit, "that
without a special grief shown by the
plaintiff, the action lies not," but it ik
punishable in the leet. See, also, Anon.,
Moore 180, No. 321.
Again, in Paine v. Patrich, Carth.
194; 3 Mod. 289 (1690), HOLT, C. J.,
said that if a highway be stopped that
a man is delayed a little
while on his
journey, by reason whereof he is damnifled, or some important affair neglected,
that is not such a special damage for
which an action of the case would lie ;
but that the damage ought to be direct
and not consequential, as the loss of his
horse, or some corporal hurt in falling
into a trench in a highway.
This last proposition, probably, is not
the modem law, that the damage must
be so direct and immediate as the loss of
a horse or some corporal injury. See 22
Vt. 114.
In O'Brien v. Norwich 4- Worcester
Railroad Co., 17 Conn. 372 (1845), the
plaintiff was the owner of premises on
navigable waters, and the defendants
were about to construct a railroad across
them, which would interfere with the
passage of boats, &c., to and from the
plaintiff's premises; and he brought a
bill for an injunction, not alleging any
special injury to his estate, but only an
interference with the common right of
passing and repassing, and it was held
no private injury for which a bill would
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lie. And the same principle was again the obstruction or by going a less conway. But this was not sus
applied in Leele.y v. Bishop, 19 Conn. 128 venient
KELLY, C. B., saying: "In
rained;
(1848), for obstructing a navigable creek
where there was no pecuniary
case,
this
passing
of
by a dam, to the prevention
damage, where the plaintiff, on one or
and repassing merely.
occasions, merely went up to the
.Mechlingv. The KihtanningBridge Co., more
and returned, and on other
obstruction
I Grant 416 (1856), is much like O'Briwent and removed the obetruc.
en's Case. See, also, Bigelow v. Hart- occasions
tions ; that is to say, he suffered an incon
ford Bridge Co., 14 Conn. 556 (1842);
venience common to all who happened to
CZark v. Say/brook, 21 Id. 314 (1851)
pass that way. I think that to hold the
McCowan v. Whitesides, 31 Ind. 235
maintainable would be equivalent
-action
(1869); Johnson v. Stayton, 5 Harr.
it is impossible to imagine cirsaying
to
(Del.) 362 (1852).
in which such an action coula
cumstances
So in Hartshorn v. South Reading, 3
See, also, Carpeniaintained."
be
not
in
bill
a
held
it
was
Allen 501 (1862),
(1853) ; Houcl
155
Wis.
17
terv.M3fann,
equity would not lie to abate a nuisance
Wachter, 34 Md. 265 (1870).
in the erection of a fence across a high- V.
Possibly, some cases may have sancway by one whose land did not abut
than above laid
directly upon it, and who was only in- tioned a broader rule
v. Scott, I
Pittsburgh
in
Thus,
down.
jured in common with others, by being
(1845), the defendant had
deprived of tile use of the highway, al- Penn. St. 309
piled boards in one of the public streets
though by reason of proximity his occawhich had
sion to use it was more frequent, and the of the city of Pittsburgh,
to carts, &c., emdeviation
some
caused
greater
him,
to
therefore,
inconvenience,
by the city authorities in carrying
than that to which other persons might ,ployed
for the use of the
be subject. And see Brainard v. Con- dirt and other materials
inconvenient
more
no
was
this
that
;
city
necticut River Railroad Co., 7 Cash. 511
to the city than to others who might have
(1851).
the city
Winterbottom v. Lord Derby, Law Rep. occasion to pass that way; u).
but
2 Ex. 316 (1867), isthe mos; modern im- was allowed to maintain the action;
extreme.
the
to
goes
certainly
this
There
point.
this
on
case
portant English
Passing from the mere delay or inconit was distinctly adjudged after full arguof taking a different route, it
venience
many
of
consideration
a
on
and
ment,
clear that if such delay does
equally
seems
cases, that if the plaintiff proves no specal damage to himself beyond being de- cause peculiar damage, either to the perlayed on several occasions in passing son or property of the plaintiff, this gives
along a highway, and being obliged, in a right of action.
Thus, in Marellv. &ltmarsh, 1 Keb.
common with all others using the way,
erected posts
either to pursue his journey by a less di- 847 (1666), the defendant
the plainwhich
through
highway,
the
in
he
obstruction,
the
remove
to
rect road or
cannot sustain an action. In the argu- tiff passed to and from his land in another
ment it was urged that an indictment for village, and in consequence of the delay
obstructing a highway is grounded upon from the obstruction he alleged his corn
the mere possibility, and not on the fact was corrupted and spoiled, and this was
the acof the public being prevented from using held sufficient damage to sustain
not appear
it, but that any one who actually suffers tion ; possibly, because it did
by which
positive inconvenience personally from * that there was any other way
and so his inthe obstruction may have his action, and t he could reach his close,
jury was of a different kind from that 4>f
that actual delay is a cause of action,
whether caused by stopping to remove others.
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Hart v. Bassett, T. Jones 156 (1682),
road, by means of which the plaintiff was
is often referred to in this connection. compelled togo, and did go,
several times,
The plaintiff alleged that he was entitled a longer and more difficult way to and
to certain tithes of the parish of B., and from his premises, and also the defind.
was possessed of a certain barn into ant in person opposed the plaintif
in
which he was going to carry and depositt attempting to remove the nuisance, and
his tithes, and that the direct way to prevented him from removing the obcarry them to his barn was by a certain struction, and the action was sustained.
highway, which the defendant obstructed And the latter ground has been thought
by a ditch and gate across it, by reason to be the most tenable.. The obstruction
whereof "he was forced to carry them being a nuisance, the plaintiff had a
legal
by a longer and more difficult way.)
right to abate it and pass on; but being
After verdict for 51. damages, it was prevented from abating it, he was entitled
moved in arrest of judgment that this to bring his action. See Law, Rep.
2
way, being alleged to be a highway, the Ex. 319.
obstruction was a common nuisance, and
In Hughes v. Heiser, I Binn. 463
this damage is not such for which an ac- (1808), the defendant had obstructed
tion will lie, for then every one who had the Schuylkill river, a public stream, by
occasion to go this way might have his the erection of a dam, so constructed that
action, which the law will not suffer, for the plaintiff's
rafts could not pass over it,
the multiplicity. And lvilliams's case, and on reaching the dam he was actually
I Inst. 59, was cited for it. But, resolved prevented from taking it down
and so
by the whole court (Banco Regis), that lost the voyage. He was allowed
to rethe action lay. And it was said that the cover 401. damages, not because his timcommon rule ought not to be taken too ber land was rendered less valuable
belargely. But in this case the plaintiff cause of the
obstruction to navigation,
had particular damage, "for the labor for this might be common
to many others,
and pains he was forced to take with his but because his own damage was palpac.attle and servants by reason of this ob- ble and peculiar to himself.
struction, may well be of more value
Rose v. Miles, 4 M. & S. 101 (1815),
than the loss of a horse, or such damage is a very important case on this point.
as is allowed to maintain an action in The defendant obstructed a public navisuch a case. Judgment for the plaintiff." gable creek by mooring his barge across
But this case has been explained by the same, thus actually preventing the
saying that the plaintiff, being a farmer plaintiff from navigating his loaded
of tithes, was obliged to take them, and barges, and so he was compelled to carry
was liable to an action if he did not take his goods overland at great expense, and
them away within a reasonable time, or the action was supported.
allowed the tithe to be injured on the
And Lord ELLENBOROUGH Said: "In
ground. He was therefore obliged to Hubert v. Groves, 1 Esp. 148, the damage
expend extra money in the discharge of might be said to be common to all, but this
his lawful calling in consequence of the is something different, for the plaiptiffwas
obstruction ; and that fact made it a in the occupation, if I may so say, of the
peculiar pecuniary damage suffered by navigation; he had commenced Ils course
him personally. See Law Rep., 2 Ex. upon it, and was in the act of using it
321.
when obstructed. It did not rest merely
In OCrhesterv. Lethbridge, Willes 71 in contemplation. Surely this goes one
(1738), the defendant obstructed the step further; this is something substanhighway by a ditch or gate across the tially more injurious to this person than

FRITZ v. HOBSON.
to the public at large, who might only
have it in contemplation to use it. If a
man's time and money are of any value,
it seems to me this plaintiff has shown a
particular damage."
D".naa, J., added: "The final case,
I think, admits of this distinction from
most other cases, that here the plaintiff
was interrupted in the actual .enjoyment
of the highway. -The expense was incurred by the immediate act of the defendant, for the plaintiff was forced to
inload his goods and carry them overUand.; If this be not a particular damage, I scarcely know what is."- See,
also, Wig9y v. Boddington,- C. & P.
544.
In Greasly v. Codling, 2 Bing. 263;
9 Moore 489 (1824), the defendant
obstructe'l the highway, on which the
plaintiff was accustomed to carry his
carts, an'l he was actually detained four
hours wth three loaded asses, and could
not carry as many loads in a day by the
circuitnus route be was obliged to take,
and a verdict for the defendant was set
aside; presumably on the case of Rose
v. des.
In Brown v. Watson, 47 Me. 161
('359), the plaintiff was returning home
with a loaded team, and found the road
wholly obstructed by logs and trees felled
across it by the defendant, and which he
could not then remove; he was compelled
to go back with his load and reach his
house by another road, a distance of
about two nmites. For "the trouble and
loss of time thus arising," he was allowed
to recover, upon the authority of Giesly
Y. Codling, and Rose v. Miles.
L snosv. Hamilton, 27 Wis. 256 (1870),
is another excellent illustration of special
damages. The plaintiff alleged that he
owned a tannery on a river, and the only
place he could procure his tan-bark was
above his works at a certain place on the
stre~un, and the defendant .totally ob-trdctedthe same with logs and lumber,
by which be- wa obliged to suspend

operations and his men were a long time
idle; and the action was sustained, as
clearly it should have been.
In Dudey v. Kennedy, 63 Me. 465
(1874), the plaintiff had contracted to
transport a quantity of gravel, rocks,
&c., down the Kennebec river, a public
navigable stream, but was prevented by
the erection of a boom across the river by
the defendant, "whereby he was unable
to pass and perform his contract, and was
deprived of the employment of his scows,
and obliged to remain idle for twenty
days or more," and he was permitted to
recover for such damages, as being "over
and above those inflicted upon the general
public."
And in the light of the foregoing authorities, it may well be doubted whether
the Court of Appeals in South Carolina
did not swing too far the other way, when
they held in Casey v. Brooks, I Hill 36-5
(1833), that a plaintiff had no remedy by
action, who, in navigating a stream with
his raft, was delayed by the defendant's
obstructions about a month, and was
obliged to pay $125 to clear out thu
channel so that he could pass, and also
incurred a penalty for not delivering his
lumber below at a fixed time by his contract. But the case was cited subsequently with apparent approbation in
McLaucdlin v. Railroad Co., 5 Rich.
592.
How small a damage actually incurred
will support a private action is well illustrated by the case of Pierce v. Dart, 7
Cowen 609 (1827). The defendant
erected a fence across a public highway,
and the plaintiff in going to and from
church, was obliged to stop and pull-it
down in order to pass; this he did fen.
times, the whole time being but a trifle,
and not estimated by any witness loss to be
over twenty-five cents for the whole four
times ; but this was held sufficient to
warrant a special action, and the cases
were carefully examined. Still, the
courts of that state usually apply the
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general rule with great strictness in some
other cases.
In Lansing v. Wiswall, 5 Denio 213
(1848), it was thought that the expenses
of removing an unlawful obstruction in
the highway, was such a peculiar damage
that an action would lie therefor.
But this is directly opposed to the late
English case of Winterbottom v. Lord
Derby, supra. The plaintiff' there alleged
"he was obliged to incur, and did incur
on divers days, great expense in and
about removing the said obstructions,"
and that allegation raises the question,
said KELLY, C. B., whether this sort of
damage is recoverable. "I think not;
for if it were, anybody who desires to
raise the question of the legality of an
obstruction has only to go and remove
it, and then bring an action for the
expense of removing it. There would
then be two modes open to everybody
of trying whether the obstruction be
lawful, namely, by indictment, or by action. But, if a person chose the latter
way, and removes the obstruction, he
only incurs an expense such as any one
would who might go to remove the obstruction. The damage is, in one sense,
special; but it is in fact common to all,
who might wish, by removing the obstruction, to raise the question of the
right of the public to use the way. I am
of opinion that the true principle is, that
he, and only he can maintain an action
who has sustained some damage peculiar
to hirself, his trade or calling. A mere
passer-by cannot do so, nor can a person
who thinks fit to go and remove the obstruction. To say they could, would
really be, in effect, to say that any of the
Queen's subjects could."
II. When the obstruction complained
of is immediately in front of or adjoining
the plaintiff's premises, so as to directly
prevent access thereto. Here the tendency
is to allow a private action, when otherwise it might not be sustained.
Thus, in Barren v. Maynr of Baltimore, 2 Am.Jur. 203 (1829), the plain-

tiff owned a wharf in the city of Baltimore, and the city authorities diverted
certain streams of water from their natuoral channels to a point just above the
plaintiff's wharf, whereby large deposits
of earth and sand were carried down and
deposited near the wharf, materially lessening the depth of water at the wharf,
and so impairing its value. A verdict
for $4700 damages was sustained.
So, in Green v. Kleinhans, 2 Green
(N J.) 472 (1834), it seems to have
been held that if a man digs a ditch in a
public highway, immediately in front of
another's house, so that access to his
premises becomes inconvenient and dangerous, this is such a special or peculiar
damage as to maintain a private action.
In Abbott v. Mills, 3 Vt. 521 (Il31).
the plaintiff, who owned a building fronting on a public square, was allowed to
recover private damages for ereeting an
out-building on the square itself, whereby
"the enjoyment and value of the plaintiff's premises had been considerably
lessened and impaired ;" but the main
question discussed was, whether the land,
when the defendants erected their building, was, or was not public, and thu
opinion adds but little to the la~v on this
vexed question.
Rose v. Groves, 5 M. & G. 613, better
reported in 6 Scott N. R. 645 (1843), is
the most emphatic English case to this
point. An innkeeper, whose house abutted on a navigable river (the Thames).'
was allowed to recover 201. damages for
wrongfully placing timbers in the stream
and keeping them there opposite the
house, whereby access to the house was
obstructed, and various persons prevented
from coming there as guests; and procf
was offered that the plaintiff's business
had in fact fallen off since the obstruction,
and the ruling was approved, principally
upon the authority of Iveson v. Moore;
referred to infra, and Wilkes v. The
Hungerford Market Co., 2 Scott 446,
MAULE, J., saying, at page 616: "This
is not an action for obstructing the river;
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but for obstructing the access to the
plaintiff's house on the river," but the
court seem inclined to hold that even if
the plaintiff was complaining of a public
nuisance he could maintain the action on
the facts thereon. See Lyon v. _lshnongers Co., L. R., 1 App. Cas. 675 (1876).
This point was really involved in the
late case of Harvard College v. Stearns,
15 Gray 1 (1860). The plaintiff there
owned a wharf on one side of a creek,
and the defendant owning the lot directly
opposite, partially filled up the creek
against the plaintiff's land, and a suit
brought simply for depreciation in the
value of the wharf, because neither the
plaintiff's servants or other persons could
approach it by water, but no evidence
was offered or any claim made because
of any actual hindrance or delay to the
plaintiffs, but the claim was expressly
put on the mere ground of "injuryto the
land by reason of an obstruction placed
in a navigable stream or public way,
whereby the land would be more difficult
of access and less valuable." The action
was not sustained. It may be inferred
from the language used in this case, that
the result might have been different had
the plaintiffs offered evidence of obstruction to an actual passage or approach to
their wharf, or of any injury to their
property differing at all in kind from
that which accrued in a greater or less
degree to all riparian proprietors above.
See Bra.yton v. Fall River, 113 Mass.
229. The precise ground of recovery
pointed out so sharply in Rose v. Groves,
5 'M. & G. 613, does not seem to have
been brought to the attention of the
court.
In Blane v. KMumpke, 29 Cal. 156
(1865), it was held that if obstructions
in a navigable river affect the plaintiff
only in common with the public at large,
although in a greater degree, he cannot
have his private action ; yet if he is
thereby obstructed in the free use of his
property on said stream, and its comfortaole enjoyment thereby prevented, this is

a private and personal injury for whici
an action will lie. And see, also, Yolo
County v. City of Sacramento, 36 Cal. 193
(1868).
So, in Sahulte v. ,Vort Pacific TransportationCo., 50 Cal. 592 (1875), it was
held that if an obstruction is placed in a
public street in front of the plaintiff's lot,
which prevents him from having free access to his premises, he may have a private action against the person making
the obstruction. See also, Venard v.
Cross, 8 Kans. 248 (1871), in which the
distinction is thoroughly brought out on
page 255. Thus "it is alleged, say the
court, that the erection of the dam, making the ford impassable, obstructs the
highway. So far, it stands simply a
wrong to the public, for which it alone
can maintain an action. But it goes further, and alleges that this highway is the
plaintiff's only means of ingressand egress
to his land. Obstructing such a highway, therefore, prevents his access to his
lands. There is disclosed a particular
injury to the plaintiff; one differing in
kind, not merely in degree, from that
suffered by the community in general.
It is not that the plaintiff uses this highway more than others, but that the way
is a particular necessity for him-affords
him an outlet to his farm. It is to him a
use and benefit differing from those enjoyed by the public at large. He, therefore, can maintain a private action."
Both phases of this subject are well
illustrated by the recent case of Brayton
v. Fall River, 113 Mass. 218 (1873).
The plaintiff owned a wharf and adjoining land situate upon a creek, in which the
tide ebbed and flowed, and where he did
a large grain and flour business; and the
city of Fall River bad, by its city drains,
collected a large quantity of water into
one main sewer, which discharged into
the creek above the plaintiff's wharf,
whereby gravel, sand and sediment was
carried down and accumulated and partially filled up the creek in front of the
plaintiff's wharf, and he had incurred

FRITZ v. HOBSON.
large expenses in removing the same,
and had also expended large sums in
getting vessels to his wharf over the obstructions. After a careful review of the
Massachusetts authorities, which were
supposed to restrict the right to bring a
private suit within narrower limits than
seems to have been adopted in the English cases, MoRToN, J., said: "It follows, from the authorities we have cited,
that the plaintiff cannot maintain a private action for any loss or injury to him
arising merely from an obstruction to
navigation caused by the defendants. If,
for instance, the effect of the defendant's
acts had been merely to create a bar across
the mouth of the creek so as to destroy or
injure its navigability, the plaintiff could
not maintain an action because it was
thereby rendered more difficult and expensive to reach his wharf, or because his
wharf was rendered less valuable. Those
would be injuries of the same kind, sustained by all other persons who have occasion to use the creek, or who owned
land bordering upon it. But, in this
case, the evidence tended to show that
the effect of the sewers had been to fill up
the creek directly in front of and adjoin.
ing the plaintiff's wharf, so that his vessels, which he was accustomed to employ
to bring grain to his wharf and elevator,
could not lie at the wharf on account of
the diminished depth of water. We are
of opinion that this was an injury, special
and peculiar to him, for which he may
maintain this action. He has a right to
the water at his wharf at its natural
depth. By the filling up of the creek,
his use of his wharf for the purposes for
which it had been constructed and actually used was impaired, and he was subject to an inconvenience and injury which
was not common to the public. Suppose
a person had tipped stones off hts wharf,
forming a pile which prevented any profitable use of it, it would be an obstruction to
the navigationof the creek, and to that extent the injury would be a common one
to all the public, but the plaintiff would
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suffer an injury in the hindrance of the
use of his property, to which no one else
would be exposed."
The recent case of Lyon v. Fishmoongers
Co., in the House of Lokds, 1 App. Cas.
662 (1876), is a direct adjudication upon
the very point. See, also, Haskell v.
New Bedford, 108 Mass. 216 ; Clark v. "
Peckham, 10 R. I. 35; Frink v. Lawrence, 20 Conn. 118; Dobson v. Blackmore, 9 Q. B. 991 ; Knox v. New York,
55 Barb. 404; Walker v. S'epardson, 2
Wis. 384.
'rho same discrimination was made in
Blood v. Nashua 4 Lowell RailroadCo.,
2 Gray 137 (1854). The defendants
built a bridge across a stream in such a
manner as to somewhat olbstruct navigation, and also caused the water to flow
back upon the plaintiff's saw-mills; and
he was allowed to recover for this last
damage, because it was special and peculiar to himself; but not damages simply
because it was made more inconvenient
and expensive to float logs to his mills
under the bridge; that being an injury
suffered in common with the public, simi
har in kind and differing only in degree.
III. Where the obstruction, at some
distance from the plaintiff's premises, so
interferes with access thereto as to naturafly impair their value.
In Burrows v. Pixley, I Root 362
(1792), the earliest reported case in
America on this point, the plaintiff
owned a ship-yard on a navigable river,
where he carried on shipbuilding, and the
defendant constructed a dam across the
river below, by which the navigation was
effectually obstructed, and he was allowed
to maintain the action, although the declaration contained no allegation that any
vessel had in fact been hindered or obstracted from going up and down the
same, but this is a broader rule than is
anywhere recognised.
Thus, in Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cowen
146 (1828), the plaintiff owned a dock
in a basin on the Hudson river, in the
city of Albany, and the defendant erected
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an obstruction in the river, by which
access to the dock was rendered inconvenient, and for vessels, with masts, quite
impracticable, and so he lost the profits
of it. There was no allegation of being
actually hindered or any actual loss of
sale or letting of the dock, but only a
general allegation of depreciation of property resulting from these public obstructions; but he was not allowed to recover:
Affirmed in 4 Wend. 9.
So, in Dougherty v. Bunting, I Sandf.
1 (1848), B. owned a store on South
street, New York city, and in front of it
was a wharf, extending into East river.
Other parties were in the habit of piling
wood on the wharf and street, which
made B.'s stqre less accessible and valuable; and, although the plaintiff proved
that he could rent the store if the wood
could be.removed, and that it was now
unoccupied, and so the damages were not
merely speculative and constructive, he
was not allowed to recover. Following
and approving Lansinq v. Smith.
Equally clear was the case of Brightman v. Fairhaven, 7 Gray 271 (1856).
The obstruction complained of was a dam
across a navigable stream. The plaintiff
owned land above the dam, and claimed
damages upon tfle ground that the obstruction prevented the use of his land as
a spar-yard, and interfered with his actess thereto from the sea. In fact the
plaintiff had never used his land for a
spar-yard, either before or since the oh.
struction, although it was naturally well
adapted to that purpose; but after the
obstruction he had hired land below the
dam for a year, and had been obliged to
drag his spars by land to It. But the
court held he could not maintain a private action, as the damages claimed were
1 such as might be sustained by the other
owners of land on the stream by reason
of its being navigable, and tending only
to show a general depreciation of the
land occasioned by the obstructions in
the river."
In Willard v. Cambride, 3 Allen 574

(1862), the alleged nuisance consisted
in the removal of a bridge forming part
of a highway; the plaintiff had a lumber, wood and coal wharf adjacent to the
bridge, and alleged that he was injured
in his business, that access to his wharf
was destroyed, that his houses occupied
by his tenants were rendered less desirable, and that he was obliged to abate
from his rents in order to keep his
tenants. But the court held these damages were of the same kind as those
caused to all persons who owned property
on the highway leading to the bridge,
and who had occasion to use it, and
were not special or peculiar to the plaintiff so as to create a good cause of
action.
In Fall River Iron Works Co. v. Old
Colony J- Fall River Railroad Co., 5
Allen 211 (1862), it was held that if
the public nuisance complained of merely caused an obstruction to navigation,
the plaintiffs had no private remedy,
though the injury sustained by them
was, by reason of their proximity to the
nuisance, much greater in degree than
that sustained by others.
And again in Blacdwell v. Old Colony
Railroad, 122 Mass. 1 (1877), this rule
was emphatically repeated. The defendants built a bridge across a navigable stream. The planitiff owned land
and a wharf above. His business was
that of buying, selling and transporting
merchandise to and from his wharf.
His was the only wharf so used. By
reason of the obstruction he was compelled to abandon his business, and
transport his goods overland, at a ct~t
of $1000 a year, and the value of his
estate was greatly depreciated. But the
declaration was held to contain no cause
of action. "The ease has no analogy,"
says GREY, C. J., " to those in which an
obstruction in a navigable stream sets
back the water upon the plaintiff's land,
or being against the front of his land
entirely cuts off his access to the stream,
anid thereby causes a direct and of
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peculiar injury to his estate, or in which
the carrying on of an offensive trade
creates a nuisance to the plaintiff."
In some of these cases the damage to
the plaintiff's estate might be considered
speculative, theoretic and not capable
of positive proof. And a different result has sometimes been reached, when
damage has been found to have actually
occurred.
Thus in Baker v. Moore, cited in 1
14. Raym. 491, the court thought an
action would lie for obstructing a highway, in consequence of which the plaintiff's tenants left his houses, and he lost
the profits of them.
So in &etson v. Faxon, 19 Pick. 147
(1837), the defendant erected a wareiose which projected several feet into a
public street in the city of Boston, and beyond the plaintiff's warehouse adjoining
on the same street; by reason whereof,
the plaintiff's warehouses were obscured
from view of passers-by and travel
was diverted to a distance, and the
warehouses being less eligible for places
of business, the plaintiff was obliged to
reduce his rents; and the plaintiff was
allowed to recover as special damage,
the sum of $4010.12. This is probably
the leading case in America on this precise phase of the subject. See Cole v.
Sprowle, 35 Me. 161 (1852), much like
it.
Iveson v. Moore, Holt 10 ; Comb. 480;
1 Ld. Raym. 486 ; 1 Com. 58 ; 1 Salk.
15; 12 'Mod. 262 (11 Wm.3.), has
an important bearing on this question, if
the final decision can be certainly ascerrained. The plaintiff owned a colliery,
and had dug a quantity of coal ready for
sale. The defendant dug a colliery near
the plaintiff's, and intending to draw
away his customers and deprive him of
the profit of his colliery, stopped up the
highway by which the plaintiff used to
carry his coals, so that carts and carriages could not come to his colliery, and
he lost the sale of his coals as he alleged.
After verdict for the plaintiff, judgment
Vo. XXVIII.-80

was stayed, because no special damag
were sufficiently set forth; and on argument in the King's Bench, that court
were equally divided, TouxrtTo and
Gourn, JJ., thinking that the action
would lie, and that here was special
damage, "for all have not coal-pits."
RoxEe, and HOLT, C. J., were of a
contrary opinion. According to Salkeld,
"The court being thus divided, and
there being a former rule to stay judgment, no judgment could be entered."
According to the report in 12 Mod.
269, "judgment was stayed." Comberbach, Comyns and Ld. HOLT, himself, are all silent as to any other result
or future consideration of the case. But
at the end of the report in I Ld. Raym.
495, admitted by all, to be the fullest
report in the case, we find this statement : IIAnd afterwards, by consent of
HOLT, this case was argued before all the
justices of the Common Pleas, and
barons of the Exchequer, at Serjeant's
Inn, and they all were of opinion for
the plaintiff, that the action well lay."
The next in order was Hubert Y.
Groves, 1 Esp. 148 (1794), the plaintiff
was a coal and timber merchant, and the
defendant totally obstructed the highway
by which the plaintiff was accustomed to
transport "all things necessary for his
business," whereby he was "prevented
from enjoying his premises, and carrying on his 'trade in so advantageous a
manner as he had a right to do; and by
which the plaintiff was obliged to carry
his coals, timber, &c., by a circuitous
and inconvenient way.) IA. KzwroX
nonsuited the plaintiff, and on motion for
a new trial, the Court of King's Bench
"concurred with the chief justice a.l
refused the rule."
Wilkes v. Hungerford Market Cb., 2
Bing. N. C. 281, more fully stated in 2
Scott 446 (1835), is probably the leading case. The plaintiff, a bookseller,
having a shop by the side of a public
thoroughfare, Craven street, suffered in
his business in consequence of passengers
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having been diverted from the thoroughfare by an unauthorized obstruction
across it for an unreasonable time. After
verdict for the plaintiff for 301., the
question was carefully argued on a
motion for a nonsuit, and all the cases
from the Year Books down were carefully
examined, and the action sustained. The
injury to the general public was that
they could not walk in the same track as
before ; and for that cause alone a private
action would not lie, but the special injury to this plaintiff was the loss of trade,
which but for the obstruction he would
have enjoyed, and for that an action was
held to lie. Hubert v. Groves, was fully
overruled.
Snior v. The Metropolitan Railway
Co., 2 H. & C. 258 (1863), has a very
important bearing on thi, subject. The
plaintiff was a draper ant tailor, occupying a shop on Ray street, which he
hired at a years' rental of 261. The
defendants constructed their road across
Warner street, which connected with
Ray street, nearly in front of the plaintiff's shop, which was about thirty yards
from the railroad bridge on Warner
street. The plaintiff claimed damages
for the loss of his business by the obstruction to free travel which before existed, and not at all for injury to the
property, per se, as he did not own it.
A verdict for 601. for loss of business
alone was sustained after full argument.
And Chamberlain v. West End of London, 4-c., Railway Co., 2 B. & S. 604
(1862), is very similar. And see Western Railroad Co. v. Hill, 56 Peuna. St.
460 (1857).
In Benjamin v. &torr,Law Rep., 9 C.
P. 400 (1874), the plaintiff kept a
coffee-house, in Rose street, a narrow
street near Covent Garden. The defendants had a place of business fronting on King street, but with a rear entrance on Rose street, close adjoining
the plaintiff's premises. The defendants
kept their teams loading and unloading
at their rear entrance so large a part of

the time, that the plaintiff was obliged
to burn gas all day for light, and access
to this, his shop, was materially obstructed
and the stench arising from the horses
was so offensive as to materially lessen
the business and profits of the coffeehouse; and while the general rule was
fully recognised, it was held sufficient
private damage, and a verdict for 751.
was sustained.
This subject was elaborately considered in the late case of Ricket v. Afetropolitan Railway Co., 5 B. & S. 156
(1864), in which the facts were these:
The plaintiff was lessee of a publichouse in Crawford Passage, along which
across Coppice Row was a public footway. The defendant railway company,
for the purpose of their works, erected a
hoarding in Coppice Row, and placed
steps to enable foot passengers to pass
up one side and down the other of a
bridge over the hoarding. This was
done in accordance with their duty
under the statutes, and was so continued
for about twenty months, when the
premises were restored to their original
condition ; but after the bridge had been
so erected, the number of passengers
passing to and fro along Crawford Passage diminished, the refreshments sold
by the plaintiff at his inn decreased in
proportion, and because of the bridge,
whereby the plaintiff's profits were much
reduced, which the jury estimated to be
1001. The question was whether the
plaintiff's premises were "injuriously
affected" within the meaning of the
statute, making the defendant liable, and
it was thought by the court to be clear, that if the plaintiff would have had no
cause of action at common-law against
a person so obstructing the public way,
he clearly would not have a claim under
the statute, although the converse migh
not necessarily follow, since an action
might lie at common law, for a special damage to a personal interest,
while no compensation was given under
the statute, unless land was injuriously
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affected by the defendant's works. See
5 B. & S. 159; Caledonian Railway
Co. v. Ogilvy, 2 Macq. 535. The first
question considered then was, whether
an action would have lain at common
law, and the conclusion reached after a
statement of the prior decisions was,
that it would not; mainly because there
was no obstruction to the exercise of
any right of way by or on behalf of the
plaintiff; that neither he himself had
been obstructed, nor any one standing in
a legal relation to him, such as servant,
agent, tenant or any other relation which
gives to the plaintiff a legal interest in
their use of the way; but some unknown
travellers having a free option to pass
from north to south, either by Crawford
Passage, or any other pass, have chosen
some other pass because they do not like
the steps at Coppice Row. The plaintiff has, say the court, no cause of
action by reason of any obstruction
direct to himself, the travellers who have
chosen to turn out of their path to avoid
the steps have none, and it seems unreasonable that an obstruction which
created no cause of action, either for the
plaintiff, or for the travellers separately,
should by indirect consequence, become a
cause of action to the plaintiff because the
travellers exercised their choice as to their
path and as to their refreshment-a
choice in which the plaintiff had no manner of legal right. The plaintiff relied
much upon the case of W~ilkes v. Hungerford Market Co.; but ERIE, C. J.,
in giving judgment said, "That case is
peculiar. We have found no other precedent of an action having been maintained on an ebstruction of a highway,
when the plaintiff was not obstructed in
the exercise of any right vested in him,
and the damage was not a more direct,
natural and immediate consequence of
the obstruction. If the same question
were raised in an action now, we think
it probable the action would fail, both
from the effect of the cases which preceded Wilkes's case, and also from the

reasoning in the Caledonian Railway Co.
v. Ogilvy, 2 Macq. 229.
In that case a railway crossed a highway on a level, and the highway was
stopped by two gates while the trains
passed, and the plaintiff, living near
those gates, suffered frequent inconvenience, an inconvenience more frequently repeated than as to other persons, but yet always of the same kind,
and so no actionable special damage.
This decision was affirmed in the House
of Lords in 1867 (Law Rep., 2 H.L.
176). Lord CHELMSFORD and Lord
CRANwORTH: delivering judgments for
the defendants, and Lord WESTBURY a
dissenting opinion in favor of the plaintiffs.
The history of the case thus presents
this anomaly. The four judges of the
Queen's Bench, COCKBUm, BLACKBURN, MELLOR and SHEE, two of the
six judges of the Exchequer Chamber,
KEATING and BYLES, Lord WESTBURY
in the House of Lords, are all in favor
of the plaintiff. Four judges of the
Exchequer Chamber, and two members
of the House of Lords, have pronounced
judgments the other way, and the effect
of the decision as an authority in this
country may be reasonably supposed to
be much impaired by such a difference
of opinion. (See also Senior v. Dow
Metropolitan Railway Co., 2 H. & C.
258 ; Cameron v. Charing Cross Railway Co., 16 C. B. (N. S.) 430) and
Lord WESTBURY said: "It is a matter of regret that our judicialinstitutions
should admit of these anomalies."
Rickett's case was decided apparently
on the ground that the plaintiff's premises were not injured in value, but that
his sole loss was temporarily to his business; and several later cases seem to hold
that for injury to one's estate under like
circumstances, a railroad company would
be liable under the statutes, but without
nece.sarily deciding they would have
been ai. common law. See Beckett v.
Midland Railway Co., Law Rep., 3 C.
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P. 82 ; Hrcarthy v. Metropolitan Board
of Works, Law Rep., 7 C. P. 508 (1872),
affirmed in Ex. Ch., 8 Id. -191.
In considering the foregoing cases
where no private action has been allowed,
care should be taken to discriminate between them and another class of cases,
apparently similar, but really quite
diverse, viz. : that class of nuisances
when a wrong is directly done to private
property, or the health of an individual
is injured, or the peace and comfort
of his home impaired by the carrying on
of some offensive trade or occupation,
'which creates noxious smells or disturhing noises, or causes other annoyances and injuries to persons or property in the vicinity.
Now in all such cases it is quite immaterial how many other persons in the
vicinity may suffer in like manner, in
their persons or property from the same
cause, or even thoughthe nuisance become
so general as to be properly the subject
of indictment and public prosecution,
this fact does not at all impair the right
of every private individual to maintain
an action for his own injuries. In eases
of this character, the injury to private
property, or to the health and comfort of
individuals never becomes merged in the
public wrong, so as to take away or prevent a person injured from maintaining
an action for the damages which he himself has suffered. In all such cases the
doctrine which runs through the foregoing cases has no application, and the
distinctions there made become unimportant. Any such barrier to private
actions, would not be consistent with
sound principles. Carried out legally, it
would deprive all persons of redress for
injuries to their property or their health,
or for personal annoyances and discomiorts, whenever the nuisance was so extensive and general -as to become a
proper subject 'for a public prosecution ;
and would be offering in effect a proimm on wroffgdoing by establishing the

rule that the greater number u! persons
whom the defendant could injure by his
wrongful acts, the less liability he would
be under to indemnify any one of them.
The distinction between such cases
and those we have been thus far considering, has been well stated to be that
"when the wrongful act is a disturbance or obstruction only to the exercise
of some common and public right, and
which every member 9f the state may
exercise and enjoy, such as, for instance,
the use of a highway, canal, a public
lauding place, a common watering place,
or a stream or pond, a public navigable
river, and the like, the sole remedy is by
public prosecution, unless special damage
is caused to the plaintiff; for in such
cases, the act itself does no wrong to the
individual distinct from that done to the
whole community; but whenever the
alleged nuisance would of itself constitute
a private wrong by directly injuring the
property, health or comfort of a person,
and for which an action could be maintained, if no other person was so injured, it is none the less actionable
because the wrong is committed in a
manner and under such circumstances as
to render the guilty party liable to an
indictment for a common nuisance. Multiplicity of actions in such cases, affords
no reason for denying a person all remedy for actual loss or injury he has sustained in his person or property by the
unlawful acts of another; whereas that
may be a valid objection to maintaining
private action for what is a nuisance of
a more common and public right."
It is true this distinction may have
sometimes been lost sight of, and courts
have sometimes labored, unnecessarily, to
maintain actions on the mere ground of
special and peculiar damages, differing in
kind from those sustained by the general
public; and undoubtedly the case of
Bonner v. Welborn, 7 Geo. 296 (1849),
and others like it might well rest on ,hat
ground.
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In Bonner v. Wdborn. the plaintiff
was the owner of some meiicinal springs,
much resorted to by invilids ; the defendant erected a mill-dam and pond in
the vicinity, which through the apprehension of sickness by visitors detained
them from visiting the place, whereby
the profits of the establishment were
reduced nearly $20,000 in two years,
and plaintiff was permitted to recover.
But that such actions may be maintained on the broader ground of direct
injury to the plaintiff property or business, by a wrongful act of the defendant,
vhatever be the number of persons injured, is clearly established by a long
series of adjidications. See ,oltau v.
De Held, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 133; Tipping
v. St. Helen's Smelting Co., 4 B. & S.
608, andll H.L.C. 642; Wesson v.
Mashburn Iron Co., 13 Allen 95 ; Barnfoid v. Turnley, 3 B. & S. 66 ; Spencer
v. London 4- Birmingham Railway Co.,
a Sins. 193 ; Francis v. Schoelll:opf,
N. Y 152; Greene v. Nunnesacher, 36
Wis %0.

From this review of the authorities on
this vexed question, although they may
not all be easily reconciled, certainly not
without subtle and refined distinctions,
some general principles are fairly deducible, which may be thus stated:
1st. For any act obstructing a public and common right, no private actin
will lie for damages of the same kind as
those sustained by the general public,
although in a much greater degree than
any other person.
2d. An action will lie for peculia
damages of a different kind, though
even in the smallest degree.
3d. The damages if really peculiar
need not always be direct and immediate, like the loss of a horse, but may
be as remote and consequential as in
other cases of tort.
4th. The fact that many others sustain an injury of exactly like kind is
not a bar to individual actions in many
cases of a public nuisanee.
EDMUND H. BExNETT.
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THE QUEEN v. ORTON.
By Me common law, several distinct misdemeanors of the same kind may be
charged in different counts of the same indictment. The practice is different in the
case of several felonies, but semble, even that is within the discretion of the court.
Upon conviction of several offences, whether in separate indictments or in separate counts of the same indictment, sentence upon one may be made to take effect
after the expiratina of the sentence on another of them.
False testimony given upon two different occasions, though the language used and
the object in view were the same in both, and both were parts of the same general
judicial procieeding, constitute two distinct perjuries, for which separate and cumulative sente'.s may be imposed.

THis was a common-law indictment for perjury, containing two
counts; one offence was alleged to have been committed before a
master in chancery, and the other in open court, at a trial at law
in the Court of Common Pleas at Westminster; the one was ancillary to the other, the object being the recovery of the Tichborne
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estates, and the perjury in both instances consisting of a reiteration by the prisoner that he was Mr. Roger Tichborne. It was
now contended that the second sentence of seven years penal servitude ought not to have been cumulative, but even if there were
two distinct acts of pejury, the maximum of punishment should
not have been exceeded by successive sentences.
Mr. Benjamin, Q. C., Mr. Atherly Jones, Mr. .ederwick, and
Mr. ussell Spratt, appeared for the prisoner.
The Attorney-General, the Solicitor-General, and Mr. Poland,
with Mr. Bandmann, for the crown.
Lord Justice JAmEs.-I am of opinion that this writ of error
issued improvidently. The subject is one which might be supposed
to be decided by a current of authority and a course of practice
which it is not open to any person in this country to disregard. The
law is, and always has been, that several misdemeanors may be
joined in one indictment, that is, in several counts in one indictment; that is to say, may be the subject of several distinct
charges or indictments put together in one piece of parchment, but
each count beifig in law a distinct charge or indictment upon which
a man ought to be tried and convicted or acquitted, as the case may
be. A practice has prevailed in cases of felonies, by which the
judges, in the exercise of their power of regulating the proceedings before them, thought it right (in times when many felonies
were capital), that a man should not be tried for more than one
felony at the same time. But no such practice has prevailed with
regard to trials for misdemeanors, though in a proper case, if the
judge saw that prejudice would arise to the prisoner by compelling
him to meet different charges at the same time, he would put the
prosecutor to elect on which of them to proceed; which, however,
would only be an exercise of his discretion, not reviewable on a
writ of error. That being the law that a man might be tried at
the same time for several misdemeanors, the subject of several distinct counts, there is, to my mind, no possible reason for any distinction to be drawn between such a trial and conviction on several
charges on one indictment and several trials on several indictments.
In the case of Wilkes it was certainly settled that, for several misdemeanors, the subject of distinct indictments, one tried after the
other, and sentences pronounced on one after the other, it was held
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by the House of-Lords that one sentence of imprisonment might
be passed, to take effect after the expiration of another. So the
law has remained unquestioned from that time to the present, and
it is too late now, after the lapse of more than a century, to attempt
to dispute it, acted upon, as it has been, in hundreds and thousands
of cases. The case in an American court has been relied upon,
indeed, as establishing a restriction upon it (that it applied only to
sentences on different indictments); and we are told it was on the
authority of that case, the late attorney-general granted his fiat for
a writ of error in the case before us. In that case it was laid down
that the law does not allow of cumulative sentences being imposed
on conviction for several misdemeanors charged in different counts
in a single indictment, in the aggregate exceeding the punishment
prescribed by law as the extreme limit of the punishment for the
particular misdemeanor. No such language is to be found in any
case in English law books. Why are we to follow that decision,
and put this restriction on the law hitherto laid down. I have
always felt unfeigned respect for the de~isions of the courts in
America upon matters of law common to their jurisprudence and
ours; but I must confess that I was startled by the mode in which
the judges in the case cited dealt with the question. They seem
to have thought it sufficient to say that the contrary view to theirs
had never been laid down, and that theirs was in accordance with
the English common law in 1775, at the era of the separation from
this country, disregarding the dicta of our judges since then. And
they treat the precedent of the sentence in the Tichborize case as
of no authority, though that was a judgment of several judges, and
theirs was only a decision of three judges overruling the opinion of
three others.
[Mr. Benjamin stated that the lord justice was here in error,
for that the judgment of the Supreme Court of New York was
that of seven judges, all of whom, as the report stated at the end,
concurred, including the chief justice, although he was absent at
the time of the judgment.]
But upon what principle or reason did their decision rest? I am
unable to discover any; and, at all events, the one suggested in
argument is startling, if not shocking, for it was this: that if a
man commits an offence of so grave a character that the utmost
punishment allowed by law for it is too light, he is free to commit
any number of offences with absolute impunity if he is tried before
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the expiration of his sentence, and with comparative immunity if
his trial is postponed until he has fulfilled his sentence under the
first, thus giving him all the chances of escape which the lapse of
time would allow. To my mind such a proposition is startling.
No authority for it is to be found in English law, and there is, in
my opinion, no foundation for it, and it seems to me that the judgment of the American court proceeded upon a view different from
that of our courts, that. different offences should not be prosecuted
in the same indictment. It was objected that the sentence of penal
servitude ought to have been additional to one of imprisonment;
but in my view- that. is only if such imprisonment is adjudged, the
statute giving only the power of imposing it. The main point,
however, was that on this statute a sentence of fourteen years was
not allowable, but only. one of seven ; for that it was all one perjury
by the defendant in swearing he was Tichborne, and that any
number of false oaths taken on different occasions, if amounting to
that, would only amount to one offence of peijury. To my mind
it is only necessary to state the proposition to dispose of it. It is
monstrous to,.suppose that the .law allows any number of pejuries
with -only one punishment, merely because all the perjuries are in
firtherance of the same fraudulent scheme. I am, therefore, of
opinion that-there is no .error upon this record, and that, therefore,
the judgment must be for the crown.
Lord Justice BRAMWELL.-I have great doubt whether I ought
to express my opinion. I am certain that the writ of error was
not allowed, without due care by the late attorney-general, and,
indeed, I think it was more than warranted by the case in the
American court; but the point is as plain a one as ever came
before a court of justice. As I understand, the first point was
that if a man brings a suit or several suits to establish his right
to certain property, that then he may take any number of false
oaths on any number of occasions, and yet commit only one
offence of peijury. I could hardly have imagined anything so
monstrous could have been urged. It was said that it would be
monstrous if he were to be punished more than once for the
offence. To my mind it would be monstrous if he were not, and I
think that if he persisted in swearing false oaths in the matter, he
ought not only to be punished again, but punished worse than he
was before.
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Then the next point was that, as the statute provides that if a
person is convicted of perjury, he shall have a sentence not exceeding seven years penal servitude, he cannot have more. The same
argument might be used as to any offence, that having once committed it, he may do it again. But what the statute means, surely
is that so often as he commits the offence he may have to suffer
such a sentence. Then. as to the other point, that the defendant
ought to have been sentenced to imprisonment, I doubt whether
he could maintain a writ of error for the omission of it. No doubt
a man maintained a writ of error on the ground that he ought to
have been sentenced, not to be transported, but to be hung; and
he is entitled to say that a wrong sentence has been passed, one
not warranted by law. But here it is different, and the objection
would be, not that the sentence was wrong, but that it was not
right enough; and further, it appears to me clear that it was not
necessary to impose imprisonment, for the sentence of transportation is only to be "in addition to" imprisonment when imprisonment is adjudged. It is a mere power, nothing more. Then
as to the objection on which this writ of error was allowed, that
there cannot be cumulative punishments on one indictment exceeding the maximum allowed for the offence. The law was laid down
differently as to different indictments in Wilke8'8 ca8e, and it is
clear that in a case of misdemeanor there may be consecutive
sentences succeeding one another. It is said, indeed, they must
not exceed the maximum. But at common law there was no
limitation, except in the general principle laid down in Magna
Charta and reaffirmed in the Bill of Rights. that punishments
ought not to be "excessive."
So that the difficulty at common
law would not arise, and there might be a sentence of seven years'
imprisonment on one count, and seven years to follow on another.
It is said, however, that by reason of the statutory limitation it is
otherwise. But except the American case, which goes against all
the authorities of our law, there is no authority for that contention,
and if it were correct a man might commit repeated offences with
impunity. Is he not to be prosecuted for the second until he has
suffered his sentence for the first? That would be preposterous.
Or is the judgment on the second to be respited until he has
suffered the first? Surely, that would be as preposterous. Is not
the reasonable and convenient course to be taken which was taken
in this case, of trying him on both charges at once, and on conXXVIH.-81
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viction, sentencing him on both? I am of opinion that such is the
proper course in such cases, and that the opposite view is opposed
to the authorities, and therefore, that the judgment in this case
must be affirmed.
Lord Justice BRETT also concurred.-After listening, he said, to
the arguments of Mr. Benjamin so little effect did they produce
upon his mind that he should have been prepared to give judgment
for the Crown. Both these objections, he observed, were now
brought' forward for the first time after the lapse of six years. As
to the first point, that the sentence of penal servitude should have
been in addition to one of imprisonment,' he thought there was
nothing in it, as the enactment was only enabling It was said
that on two other trials (those of Tine and Brown), he had taken a
different course, and had given a day's imprisonment, but that was
only by way of precaution, and not from any opinion on the
statute. Then, as to the argument that the perjuries on both
occasions were substantially the same, it seemed to him absurd, for
they were two distinct offences. It was urged that on the same
indictment they ought to have been treated as one offence, and
certainly the case of Wilkes's was one of two indictments; but he
thought several counts in misdemeanor were equivalent to several
indictments, and such had been the rule in England for three
centuries. It was said that sentences of imprisonment or penal
servitude could not succeed each other, but that was certainly
contrary to Wilkes's case, and in that case the judges laid the law
down to be that a judgment of imprisonment to commence after
the termination of a previous imprisonment was good in law, and
that without any reference to a distinction between'"counts" and
indictments. That had been the law followed ever since. The
statute 7 Geo. 4, gave the power of inflicting successive sentences
in cases of felony, even exceeding the maximum; and the same
had always been the law as to misdemeanors, the statute, as had
been said, only extending to felonies what was already the law as
to misdemeanors. Then, as to the main question, whether on such
a statute the maximum should be exceeded by successive sentences,
there was no authority, except that of the American case, and he
could not understand the ground or reason of the decision, nor,
indeed, as it seemed to him, did the judge state any. The statute,
in his view, meant that it was to apply to any distinct offence
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committed. So that if there were two distinct offences the sentence should be inflicted for each. He therefore thought the
judgment right.
The case spoken of in the foregoing
opinions as "the American case" is The
People ex d. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N.
Y. 556, upon which the Court of Appeals of the state of New York and the
Court of Appeals of the High Court of
Justice in England appear to be at
variance. The whole question hinges
seemingly upon the construction of the
common law, common to both countries.
The American court contends for the
common law as administered in this
country prior to the 19th April 1775.
The English court contends that the dzda
of judges, from that date to the present,
as well as previously, are to be received
as decisive of the common law both past
and present. That they are veritable
expositions of what the common law ever
was and still is. The American court
rejects those dicta, subsequent to 1775,
as no binding authority upon American
courts of law. Abstractly they are right.
Doubtless, whatever be the common law
of England at the present day, and whatever it may have been since the severance
of the two countries, can have no bearing on American judicature unless it be
in accordance with the common law as it
existed in both countries in April 1775.
Practically such dicta are of essential service, and invaluable as aids in enabling
the judicial mind to construe the common
law as it has existed from time immemorial to the present day, giving the
English judges the ordinary credit of
having applied it under varying and in
some instances novel circumstances to
meet the ever changing conditions of
complicated crimes and systematic delinquencies unknown in the less subtle and
less sophisticated ages of society.
It may well be, as was said by Lord
DENmA-, in O'Connell v. The Queen,
11 Cl. & Fin. 375, that in old times the

indictment consisted of a single count,
in which case there could be but one
judgment and one penalty, and the
"device of inserting many counts" may
have originated in the endeavor "to
avoid a variance," but "did not change
the law governing at the trial." (The
words of an eminent counsel in another
case, quoted by ALLzN, J., in the Tweea
Case.)
Here, however, was the first departure
from the original simplicity of one count.
The only limitation to be found in the
books, authorizing a joinder of different
offences in the same indictment, is that
they must be of the same grade and
require the same judgment. Then arises
the question, if there are separate convictions on separate counts, must the
judgments be concurrent or may the
sentences be cumulative ? It is admitted
that if these same misdemeanors were
made the subjects of different indictments,
and a conviction was obtained in each,
the sentences might be cumulative. Why
not then, if for the sake of saving much
time and money, both to the public and
the defendant, and. certainly much more
distress and harassing to the latter, may
they not be cumulative if tried in one
indictment? The only valid reason appears to be that the defendant is thus
limited in his challenges. And this may
form a good ground of objection in New
York state, where peremptory challenges
are allowed in felonies and misdemeanors
alike. But in England no peremptory
challenges are allowed in misdemeanors,
therefore that objection does not hold in
that respect in England. But yet, even
there, we apprehend the defendant might
derive some advantage by being tried by
different juries for the separate misdemeanors, the same jury convicting in one
case having a natural bias to convict in
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tke others, especially where the evidence
is of the same character if not in other
respects identical. But this" objection
cuts both ways. The same jury acquitting in one case would have a natural
bias to acquit in all. This, therefore, is
rather an objection in limine, i. e. to the
trial of more than one misdemeanor upon
one indictment. Granted that in the
interests of both the prosecution and the
defendant the including of several misdemeanors in one indictment is on the
whole desirable, why should not cumulative punishments follow convictions for
cumulative offences? To hold otherwise
i-. to subject the defendant, in case of
acquittal on the first indictment of one
m'unt, to the harassing ordeal of standing several subsequent trials for the
rmaiing charges, 'when, if convicted
on more than one indictment, he would
still be liable to suffer cumulative penalties. It is true that as a general rule in
the case of felonies, with the single
mception of distinct acts of stealing, not
exceeding three, that may have been
committed by the prisoner against the
same person within the space of six
months (14 & 15 Vict., c. 100, 16),
tke prisoner can be tried for only one
felony on the same indictment, but this
is, as we have before observed, because
otherwise he would be deprived of his
right of peremptory challenges which he
does not possess in cases of misdemeanors. And yet, we apprehend, even in
tisdemeanors he might, if tried on separate indictments and convicted on the
first, challenge the array for cause in the
second and subsequent indictments, that
cause being, if arraigned before the same
jury, that the jury might be prejudiced
by their previous verdict, and had already
pronounced adversely to him on much
the same state of facts (Archbold's Crim.
.l. ; Bouvier's Law Die., tit. Callenge,
4-2; Roscoe's Crim. Ev.) ; for if the
respective misdemeanors are dissimilar
the prosecution may be put to its election,
or the judge in his discretion may quash

the indictment Per BULLER, J., in
Young v. TIe King, 3 Term R. 98. At
all events the striking of different juries
*for the separate indictments would-effectually disarm the defendant, and afford
him no excuse or justification for challenging the array.
It appears, that prior to.1847, the
right of peremptory challenges on trials
'for misdemeanors was not allowed in
the state of New York, and hence, as
Mr. Justice ALLEN observes, "the dicta
apparently contradicting the pracuce
found in our reports, prior to that time,
may well have followed the English
cases." By the laws of 1847, c. 134.
however, any one put on trial for a misdemeanor in a court of Oyer and Terminer, has the right to challenge peremptorily, five of the persons drawn as
jurors for such trial.
Now, this statute effectually changed
the practice of including more than one
misdemeanor in the same indictment, if
indeed that practice ever prevailed in
this country, except by way of inserting
many counts, to avoid a variance.
"There is no objection," observes Mr.
Justice AT LE,

"to

stating the same

offence in as many different ways as
may be deemed expedient."
"The usage," continues the same
learned judge, "of employing numerous counts to guard against a possible
variance between the allegation and the
proof, is the sole cause of any misapprehension concerning this matter, which
may appear in some few judicial opinions. Because there may be many counts
in an indictment or declaration, and each
on its ffice must be for a different offence, it has been hastily assumed that
distinct and different transactions occurring at different times and places, and
constituting so many different offences,
may be given in evidence on the trial
of an indictment or a penal action. The
few cases that are to be found, giving an
apparent sanction to this notion, are not
sufficient to establish it :" People ex rel.
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21oad v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y. 581. At times and before diftrent jusfices, in tbb
all events such can only be treated as one state of New York, is a point that it is
offence. "If," said the same learned not within the province of the writer of
judge, "there could be but one punish- this note to determine. But it is satisfacment or punishment as for a single mis- tory to think that the respective judicial
demeanor, irrespective of the number of
opinions, if not in perfect unison, are jusoffences proved, and of which he could tified in the opposite conclusions at which
be convicted by the verdict of the jury, they have arrived, by the statutory proalthough he might be m,: rrassed in his vision existing in one country, but undefence and prejudiced n th the jury, known in the other; and yet the sacred
the court could possibly see that no principles of the lex non scriptahave, in
great harm could come to the accused no sense, been either misunderstood or
by a joinder of offences. If the rule misapplied in either case. Whether prehas this limit, then there is reason for vious to the -year 1847, more than one
the limitation, as found in the books, misdemeanor could be substantially inthat to authorize a joinder of different cluded in the same indictment in differoffences, they must be of the same grade, ent counts, so that an accused, if conand require the same judgment. If judg- victed on the separate counts, might be
ment may be distributive and cumula- punished by distributive and cumulative
tive, it is difficult to see why there should sentences, exceeding in the aggregate
be an identity as to their character and more than the full meed of punishment
extent of punishment:" Id. 577. If for any one of the offences charged, is a
there be not an identity as to their char- question that, for the purpose of the
acter and extent of punishment, even in present decision, is of no practical imEngland the judges may, at their discre- portance. But at all events, the statute
tion, put the prosecutor to his election. of the state (2 R. S. 700, 11), "directSee observations of JA.sEs, L. J., in ing that upon the conviction of a person
the Tichborne case. But yet there ap- of two or more offences, before sentence
pears no valid reason why in England
shall have been pronounced upon him for
where no peremptory challenges are al- either, the imprisonment to wlch he
lowed in trials for misdemeanors, several shall be sentenced upon the second or
offences of a like character and subject subsequent conviction shall commence at
to a like punishment should not be tried termination of the first or second term
upon one indictment, and yet the pun- of imprisonment, as the case may be,
has respect to separate convictions upon
ishment be distributive and cumulative.
The right of peremptory challenges distinct trials, and neither affirms nor dis
existing in the state of New York, as affirms the practice pursued in this case,
given by modern statute, however, is a and does got sustain it by implication or
complete answer to the supposed colli- otherwise:" per ALLEN, J., in People
sion or contradiction between the judg- ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb. "Neno bia
ment of the New York Court of Appeals puniturpro eodew delicto, " is the maxim
and that of the English High Court of
that governs the practice in beth counJustice Court of Appeal. The two opin- tries. The means of effecting this safeions are perfectly reconcilable. Whether guard alone create the difference in the
as a matter of practice, a defendant, administration of the principle.
charged with several misdemeanors in
Congress has provided by statute for
one indictment in an English criminal the joinder of several charges, against
court, be in a worse or better position the same person in the same act or transthan a defendant liable to be tried upon action, or for two or more acts or transacseveral indictments, though at different actions of the same class of crimes or
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borne case) was a common-law indictment.
Although under comparatively modern
statutes in England, different felonies
may, in some instances, be charged in
1024.
Upon a conviction of one Albro, in different counts in the same indictment,
the Circuit Court of the United States, they are such as invariably arise out of
under this statute, the court held, Judge the same transaction, with the single
NWEr.so announcing the decision of him- exception before mentioned, of not exsel and his associate, Judge HAL2 , that ceeding three acts of stealing, committed
the act did not change the common law within six months, against the same indias it existed in the state of New York, vidual. (24 & 25 Viet. c. 96, s. 5.)
and was administered by the United Those to which we refer are cutting and
States courts, sitting in that state, and wounding, with intent to kill and mu:
that the government was not entitled to der; with intent to disfigure or disable;
a judgment upon a conviction of a pris- with intent to maim ; with intent to do
oner of several offences under one indict- grievous bodily harm ; or, with intent to
And
ment containing distinct counts, except resist his lawful apprehension.
Quoted by even under such an indictment, the prisas for a single offence.
ALLzx, J., In re Tweed. In Massachu- oner may be convicted as for a misdesetts, there is a similar statute, with the meanor of unlawfully wounding (14 &
additional provision, that successive con- 15 Vict. c. 19, s. 5 and 27 & 28 Vict. c.
victions may be had, and limiting the 47) ; yet it is obvious, from the graded
aggregate term of imprisonment, under nature of the offences, be can be conanyone indictment. (Stat. of 1861, c. victed only upon one count, as it is only
181.) In a gigantic case, like that of through a failure of evidence to satisfy
Tweed's, where two hundred offences the major charge or charges that lie miny
were charged, the apparition of two hun- nevertheless be convicted of the minor.
dred separate indictments might well There can, therefore, be but one judgfrighten any court out of its propriety, ment and one statutory punishment, acbat surely the selection of some half cording to the degree of crime of which
dozen of the most prominent charges, he is convicted. It is only supererogatory
upon which convictions might reasonably to say that at common law, upon an
be expected would satisfy the ends of indictment for murder, he may be conjustice, whose object is the vindication vie.ted of manslaughter; and in an inof law, the not immoderate punishment dictment for forgery, a count may be
of the offender, and certainly not the added for uttering, and he may be coninfliction of a vindictive and unreason- victed of both. Here we have an instance of two distinct felonies, as it well
able sentence.
It is, certainly, much in favor of the might be, and often is the case, that one
decision in the Tweed case that, even in person forges the instrument and another
England, it required a statute (7 Geo. 4) person utters it, and frequently at differto enable the court to inflict successive ent times and on separate occasions.
sentences in cases of felony, exceeding And yet if one person is convicted of
the maximum allowed in any one case. beth acts, he suffers but one punishment.
(See Lord J. BmETT'S opinion.) At It may be penal servitude for life, in
common law this could not be done. which case, of course, there could be no
No such corresponding statute relates to cumulative punishment. But it may be.
in the discretion of the judge, penal sermisdemeanors. And yet this (the TeAoffences in one indictment, in several
counts, but no provision is made for several judgments on one record. 10 U. S.
Stat. at Large 162 ; U. S. Rev. Stat.
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vitude for not less than five years (27 &
28 Vict. c. 47, s. 2), or the alternative
of not exceeding two years imprisonment with hard labor, and with or without solitary confinement for stated periods of not more than three months, in
the aggregate, for the full period of two
years; but no one ever heard of a sentence of two periods of penal servitude
(though one lengthened period may be
awarded), or of two sentences of imprisonment, exceeding in the aggregate
the extreme limit of two years, with,
perhaps, an additional three months of
solitary confinement. In practice, the
prisoner is formally convicted on only
one count of the indictment, although he
may be guilty on both. The punishment
is the same on each count, but the felonies, though distinct, are virtually treated
as one, the second count being inserted
to avoid a variance. This seems somewhat analogous to the Tweed case. Bnt
these departures from the practice of the
common law are all authorized by statutory enactments. So it is only by express statute that, upon an indictment
for a felony, a person may be convicted
of a misdemeanor and vice versa. (14 &
15 Vict. c. 100, s. 9.)
It is somewhat difficult to discover
why, in a case of misdemeanor, a defendant should be placed in a worse position than in a case of felony; why he
may be convicted on the same indictment
of any number of misdemeanors and be
liable to cumulative punishments, exceeding in the aggregate the extreme penalty
for any one such misdemeanor; and except by special legislative enactment, he
can only be tried for one felony upon
one indictment, except it be a felony
such as murder, which may be reduced
to one of inferior degree, such as manslaughter, unless upon the principle, that
by including more than one charge of
felony in the same indictment the prisoner's right of peremptory challenges would
be affected, and the aggregate number of

such reduced. And yet it has been laid
down by high authority that such right
of peremptory challenges was originally
given by the common law infavorem vit,,
and most, if not all, felonies originally
were capital: Co. Litt. 156 ; 4 B1.
Com.352 ; Com.Dig. (Challenge) (C) ;
Gray v. R., 11 Clk. &Fin. 447 ; though
now extended to all felonies. (6 Geo. 4,
c. 50, s. 29, limiting the number of
peremptory challenges to twenty.)
Such appeared to be the pivot upon
which thi decision in the Tichborne case
has turned, although it is not expressly
stated so in the judgment. In the Tweed
case, on the other hand, the judges are
very explicit in pointing out the injustice
a defendant would sustain in thus being
deprived of his right of peremptory challenge, which, in the state of New York,
is allowed in felonies and misdemeanors
alike, and though they more than once
refer to and cite the statute creating, or
rather extending this privilege to misdemeanors, and intimate that such may
make all the difference between the common law as administered in that state
and in England, yet Lord Justice JAiEs
is unable to discover any reason upon
which their judgment is based, although
he admits there must be some difference
between the law in the state of New York
and the law as received and administered
in England, his lordship's words being:
"It seems to me that the judgment of
the American court proceeded upon a
view different from that of our courts."
Again, the English judges speak of
Tweed's case as the "American case,"
and the court, as the "American court,"
as if indeed the decision were that of the
Supreme Court of the United States,
instead of merely a decision of the Court
of Appeal of a single state, based upon
a statute of the state legislature, and,
therefore, no binding authority on other
states.
HUGH WEIGHMXA.
Sept. 1880.

